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SPACE GOVERNANCE 3.0* 
 
Brian R. Israel** 
 
I want to first give my thanks and congratulations to the editors of the 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law and to the Dean Rusk 
Center, for a timely and beautifully executed symposium. 
I will contribute to our confrence theme, the “Future of Space Govern-
ance,” by offering a perspective on evolutionary changes in how the rules 
governing human activity in the space domain are made, and who makes 
them.1 I’ll begin by unbundling what I see as the constitutive strands of our 
topic. Assumptions about the future of space activities necessarily underpin 
predictions about the future of space governance, and I will shortly outline my 
assumptions in this regard. I will do the same for the national and international 
lawmaking processes that shape the international regime for outer space. In 
short, I do not foresee the conditions for major multilateral treatymaking re-
turning in the near term,2 although I hope to be proven wrong. I do foresee the 
intervention of a new technological medium for governance enriching the fu-
ture of space governance. Accordingly, I will introduce blockchain technolo-
gies and illustrate how the capacity of spacecraft operators to make and en-
force commitments, without recourse to a national legal system, may unlock 
new solutions to governance challenges inherent in the legal and physical at-
tributes of the space domain. 
My assumptions about the future of space endeavors are closely linked 
with my own experience with emerging space technologies and activities; I’ll 
summarize this experience to make my biases and blind spots apparent. I 
served in the State Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser from 2009 to 
2017. For most of this time, I was the primary official responsible for interna-
tional negotiations to interpret and apply the international legal framework for 
space to newly-contemplated space activities. I also worked to adapt U.S. reg-
ulatory frameworks for non-governmental space activities to implement inter-
national obligations. My time at the State Department coincided with a new 
 
 * Presented at the “The Future of Space Governance” conference at the University of 
Georgia School of Law, October 28, 2019. 
    ** Co-founder, ConsenSys Space; Lecturer, Berkeley Law. 
 1 The scope of space governance rules I address are those of common concern to users 
and beneficiaries of activities in the space domain. Domestic rules about space activities 
serving only national public policy ends, such as public safety in the vicinity of a launch 
range or national security restrictions on Earth imaging, are outside my concept of space 
governance. 
 2 See Brian R. Israel, Treaty Stasis, 108 AJIL UNBOUND 63 (2014). 
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dynamism in commercial space activities. While private enterprise has been 
involved in space exploration since the beginning, the planned activities that 
began to surface in the early 2010s combined two attributes that enlivened 
space governance debates in both the United Nations and in national capitals.  
First, whereas a government had generally been a customer—if not an opera-
tor—of commercial space activities, the government’s relationship to this new 
generation of pure commercial space activities would be solely as a regulator.  
Second, some of the planned private space missions went beyond what gov-
ernments had achieved in space and implicated the international legal frame-
work in novel ways. 
In 2017 I left government and became General Counsel of one such com-
pany: Planetary Resources, a venture-backed asteroid mining company. From 
that vantage point as a private operator trying to push forward the boundaries 
of space exploration, I gained some fresh perspective on the limits of the tra-
ditional mechanisms of space governance and began to envision a future with 
a richer set of tools for collective action in the space domain. About this time 
last year, Planetary Resources was acquired by ConsenSys, a blockchain tech-
nology company, and I co-founded ConsenSys Space and began to put my 
ideas for space governance tooling into action.   
On the opening day of the International Astronautical Congress, Consen-
Sys Space released an experimental open source, open-sensor system called 
TruSat for creating an independent record of satellite orbits.3 We designed 
TruSat to fill what we believe is a crucial gap in transparency and accounta-
bility for sustainable orbital operations by supplying a freely accessible, glob-
ally-trusted source of space situational awareness data that can be used to 
measure satellite operators’ performance against sustainability standards. Pro-
gressing TruSat from a limited prototype to a valuable resource for preserving 
the future of spaceflight will depend on the ideas and efforts of a global open 
source community. 
TruSat is but a modest first step along a path I see for how blockchain 
technologies could unlock new solutions to some of the most stubborn space 
governance challenges. I will introduce the opportunities I see, mindful of the 
perils of predicting the future not only of space activities, but also a promis-
ing-but embryonic technology in its early days. 
Before we explore solutions, let’s begin with the problem. The most gen-
eral challenge of space governance I am concerned with is maintaining a co-
hesive international regime for all space actors. I use “international regime” 
as defined by Stephen Krasner: “principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area.”4  
 
 3 Press Release, ConsenSys, ConsenSys Space Launches TruSat System (Oct. 21, 
2019), https://consensys.net/blog/press-release/consensys-space-trusat-_-10-22-2019/. 
 4 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables, 36 INT’L ORG. 185 (1982). 
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While I refer to international regime in the singular for simplicity, the future 
of human space endeavors will likely require a number of specialized regimes 
to account for practical and political realities that vary by activity and location.  
For example, the physics and prevailing uses of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) coun-
sel for different end-of-life spacecraft disposal practices than the Geosynchro-
nous Orbit (GEO). The maturation of space resource utilization activities will 
almost certainly require an international regime addressing the most funda-
mental dimensions of this family of activities, as well as specific regimes for, 
say, the Moon, or even lunar poles. 
The growing number and diversity of space actors, a symptom of progress 
in many respects, also challenges the cohesion of the international regime.  
This growth, diversity, and the attendant governance challenges are most ap-
parent in LEO, where university cubesat missions share the increasingly con-
gested orbital regime with all manner of commercial satellites and govern-
ment national security missions. So-called “mega-constellations” of LEO 
satellites blanketing the Earth in broadband internet coverage are projected to 
increase the population of active LEO satellites ten-to-twenty-five-fold over 
the coming decade.5 This magnitude of LEO congestion, dramatically increas-
ing the frequency of potential satellite collisions, heightens the imperative for 
clear, rules-of-the-road-like norms internalized by all actors. In this domain 
beyond territorial jurisdiction, with this diversity of public and private actors, 
how do we achieve such a cohesive international regime? 
 
 5 The lower range of the estimate is based upon regulatory filings and public statements 
by SpaceX, OneWeb, and Amazon’s Project Kuiper. The Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) authorized 7,518 of the V-band satellites, and 4,409 of Ku- and Ka-band 
satellites comprising SpaceX’s Starlink constellation. See In the Matter of Space Holdings, 
LLC, F.C.C. 18-161 (Nov. 19, 2018), docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-18-
161A1.pdf; In the Matter of Space Holdings, LLC, D.A. 19-342 (Apr. 26, 2019), 
docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-19-342A1.pdf. Amazon subsidiary Kuiper, LLC has 
sought approval of a constellation that “will consist of 3,326 satellites in 98 orbital planes 
at altitudes of 590 km, 610 km, and 630 km.” FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, APPLICATION FOR 
AUTHORITY TO LAUNCH AND OPERATE A NON-GEOSTATIONARY SATELLITE ORBIT SYSTEM 
IN KA-BAND FREQUENCIES. Whereas OneWeb received FCC authorization for a constella-
tion of 720 satellites in 2017 and indicated it was considering adding an additional 1,972 
satellites, more recent public statements suggest the constellation will be fully operational 
at 648 satellites. Compare Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC 
Grants OneWeb Access to U.S. Market for Its Proposed New Broadband Satellite Constel-
lation (June 22, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-grants-oneweb-us-access-broad 
band-satellite-constellation, and Tereza Pultarova and Caleb Henry, OneWeb Weighing 
2,000 More Satellites, SPACENEWS (Feb. 24, 2017), spacenews.com/oneweb-weighing-200 
0-more-satellites/, with Caleb Henry, How OneWeb Plans to Make Sure Its First Satellites 
Aren’t Its Last, SPACENEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), spacenews.com/how-oneweb-plans-to-make- 
sure-its-first-satellites-arent-its-last/. The upper range of the estimate accounts for the Oc-
tober 2019 regulatory filings by SpaceX for an additional 30,000 Starlink satellites. See 
Caleb Henry, SpaceX Submits Paperwork for 30,000 More Starlink Satellites, SPACENEWS 
(Oct. 15, 2019), spacenews.com/spacex-submits-paperwork-for-30000-more-starlink-satel 
lites/. 
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For much of the first half century of spaceflight, the solution was to nego-
tiate the rules of the road on a global basis and then extend these global rules 
to non-governmental space missions through national legislation and regula-
tion.6  The dynamics of these international negotiations are shaped by the con-
stitutional nature of the Outer Space Treaty, and the Treaty’s constitutional 
role within the international regime for space.7 I have called this paradigm 
“Space Law 1.0.”8 The role of national legislatures in this paradigm is to ex-
tend agreements reached on the international plane to non-governmental space 
activities conducted by their nationals. In a world of frictionless international 
and national lawmaking processes, Space Law 1.0 might be the end of the 
story.  But in labeling this “Space Law 1.0,” you have probably deduced that 
the plot thickens.   
What I term “Space Law 2.0” is a diffusion of the interpretation of the 
Outer Space Treaty to national legislatures; from an inter-state negotiation to 
a series of uncoordinated intra-state negotiations. My first encounter with 
Space Law 2.0 was the Space Resources Exploration and Utilization Act of 
2015,9 which, as its name suggests, concerns the exploration and utilization 
of the natural resources of celestial bodies. At the State Department I was 
involved in shaping the Act for consistency with the United States’ obligations 
under the Outer Space Treaty. I was also the U.S. Representative to the Legal 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space at the time, and so I was responsible for explaining this contro-
versial law to the world. Contrary to the breathless headlines and genuine con-
cern this law generated around the world, I submit it changed precisely 
 
 6 Whereas non-governmental actors are not directly bound by the Outer Space Treaty 
and its progeny, Article VI of the Treaty provides that States Parties are internationally 
responsible for the non-governmental space activities of their nationals and obligates States 
Parties to continuously supervise such non-governmental activities to ensure their con-
formity with the Treaty. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 
VI, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
 7 In Space Resources in the Evolutionary Course of Space Lawmaking, 113 AJIL 
UNBOUND 114 (2019), I explained: 
Much like the U.S. Constitution, the treaty abstains from regulating spe-
cific activities, supplying instead the basic legal building blocks for ad-
dressing new activities and capabilities. The treaty’s open-textured prin-
ciples do not prescribe a single solution in most cases, but shape and 
constrain the universe of solutions. Solutions require negotiation, and the 
treaty’s open texture leaves room for negotiated outcomes that accom-
modate a range of interests. Changing the OST’s principles themselves 
is not on the table for negotiation. 
[hereinafter Israel, Space Resources]; see also Israel, supra note 2, at 64, 67 (explaining 
the forces that make amending or replacing the treaty unlikely and undesirable, placing the 
treaty in a de facto constitutional role within the regime). 
 8 See Israel, Space Resources, supra note 7, at 115. 
 9 Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 402(a), 129 Stat. 721 (codified at 51 U.S.C. § 51303). 
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nothing about the substantive law or procedure regarding space resource uti-
lization in the United States. But the concern is understandable, because, upon 
first reading, it can easily be mistaken for casually answering one of the most 
sensitive questions in international space law at the time: Whether, and under 
what conditions, the natural resources of celestial bodies may be utilized. 
I’m not going to unpack the law and politics of space resources; what’s 
important here is that the Act simply points back to the United States interna-
tional obligations without opining on the content of those obligations. Con-
gress abstained from interpreting the Treaty to expressly delineate the con-
tours of permissible space resource utilization activities.10 It left this to the 
Executive Branch, which evaluates non-governmental space activities for 
conformity with the United States’ international obligations through federal 
licensing processes. 
While the Space Resources Exploration and Utilization Act did not effec-
tuate substantive changes in space law, it is nevertheless noteworthy for the 
evolutionary trends in space activities that led the U.S. Congress to be seized 
with a controversial matter concerning the interpretation of the Outer Space 
Treaty. With the prospect of private space missions that go beyond what even 
governments have done in space, national legislatures are wading into contro-
versies over the interpretation and application of the Outer Space Treaty in 
parallel with—or even ahead of—international lawmaking processes. This 
diffusion of treaty interpretation to national legislatures is what I classify as 
Space Law 2.0.11 
A distinctive feature of Space Law 2.0 is that national legislators are not 
simply extending a settled treaty interpretation to their nationals. Absent in-
ternational consensus on what the rule is, national legislatures are in the posi-
tion of weighing in on one side or another of an unresolved interpretive de-
bate. In Space Law 2.0, knotty questions of treaty interpretation that have 
traditionally been the province of inter-state negotiations become the subject 
of multiple intra-state negotiations. 
Why does any of this matter?  Devolving the interpretation and application 
of the Outer Space Treaty to multiple intra-state negotiations makes it much 
more difficult to maintain a single, coherent international regime for all actors 
in the space domain. The worst-case scenario is legislative outcomes com-
pletely divorced from available interpretations of the Treaty, fracturing the 
regime. This, thankfully, was not what happened with the Space Resource 
Utilization Act. 
The best-case scenario is what I term “constitutional multipolarity”: the 
constitutional role of the Treaty is preserved across multiple uncoordinated 
 
 10 The Act embodies an implicit interpretation of the Treaty, insofar as it implies that the 
universe of space-resource utilization that is consistent with the United States’ international 
obligations is not a null set.  
 11 See Israel, Space Resources, supra note 7, at 116. 
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national lawmaking processes, in that policy options are constrained to avail-
able interpretations of the Treaty. The absence of a centralized, authoritative 
mechanism for adjudicating divergent interpretations suggests that there will 
be more variability in national approaches than in the Space Law 1.0 para-
digm. The difference between constitutional multipolarity and regime-de-
stroying fragmentation is in the degree of variability permitted. Good faith 
interpretations may diverge but remain tethered to the Treaty. The regime 
bends but does not break. 
What variables contribute to constitutional multipolarity in Space Law 
2.0? In my limited experience, the engagement of foreign ministry lawyers in 
the legislative process is a key determinant of whether policy options will be 
constrained to available interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty, preserving 
the Treaty’s constitutional role within the regime. While engagement by for-
eign ministry lawyers makes constitutional multipolarity more likely, it does 
not guarantee the outcome. Relative to international negotiations, the burden 
of persuasion for the relevance of international legal considerations in legis-
lative negotiations shifts from the myriad interest groups seeking to influence 
the legislative outcome to the foreign ministry lawyer. The foreign ministry 
lawyer is often just one interest group among many, and concern for treaty 
compliance just one more interest to be balanced. This is not to pretend that 
industry and other stakeholder interests are absent as foreign ministries for-
mulate positions for international negotiations. But, on the international plane, 
the foreign ministry lawyer holds the pen and interest groups bear the burden 
of persuasion. In Space Law 2.0, the dynamic is reversed. 
Contrary to the software versioning convention I’ve adopted, Space Law 
2.0 is not an improvement; it is a byproduct of disfunction in Space Law 1.0 
processes. Yet it appears that Space Law 2.0 will form a part of our present 
and future of space governance. The dynamics leading national legislatures to 
be seized with interpreting and applying the Outer Space Treaty to new activ-
ities are just beginning. Non-governmental space missions are continuing to 
break new ground. And there does not appear to be political will for resolving 
some of the most intractable interpretive controversies on the international 
plane. I foresee private planetary missions and the questions they will raise 
about obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty to avoid “harm-
ful contamination” of celestial bodies as the next Space Law 2.0 moment. 
Space Law 2.0 has not, and will not, displace Space Law 1.0. They exist 
in parallel, in layers. Space Law 1.0 is inter-state: rules negotiated by govern-
ments on the international plane and extended to private actors via national 
legislation and regulations. Space Law 2.0 is intra-state: rules are negotiated 
in national legislatures ahead of, or in parallel with, negotiations on the inter-
national plane. Both are regulatory in nature; rules are made by governments 
and imposed on private actors utilizing the public law powers of the state. As 
I consider the likely trajectories of space activities and blockchain 
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technologies and contemplate a “full stack” of space governance layers,12 I 
envision a new layer. Space Governance 3.0 will be inter-operator: private 
law regimes constructed from contracts between spacecraft operators (and 
spacecraft, in some cases) in which all space actors, public and private, play 
on a level field.13 
With ubiquitous private ordering among spacecraft operators, law in the 
space domain begins to more closely resemble the layering of public and pri-
vate law found in terrestrial legal systems. Public law provides an overall 
framework and some guardrails for private ordering; that is, there are some 
public law rules that private parties may not contract around. But in many 
dimensions of commerce, sophisticated parties do routinely contract around 
public law default rules to adopt rules better tailored to their collaborative 
objectives. Take patent pools for example: patent holders contract away cer-
tain public law patent rights where doing so serves their interests.14   
What does inter-operator private ordering add to space governance? To 
illustrate, let’s imagine that a critical mass of the world’s private satellite op-
erators can agree on a set of rules for the disposal of spacecraft at the end of 
their operational life. While such rules entail a cost for operators, the operators 
have sufficient facility with math and physics to appreciate that the rules serve 
their long-term business interests, provided that substantially all operators 
comply with the rules. How would this community of satellite operators span-
ning dozens of countries overcome this classic collective action problem and 
secure universal adherence to the rules, ensuring that compliance will not 
place an operator at a competitive disadvantage? The traditional path would 
be for operators to lobby their respective governments to negotiate and con-
clude an international agreement embodying the end-of-mission disposal 
rules, which would then be extended to private operators by national legisla-
tion and regulation. A Space Law 1.0 solution. The operators’ consensus on 
mutually-beneficial rules faces perils at every stage along this path. In my 
experience, national governments don’t necessarily share the operators’ prag-
matism, and the consensus rules may be distorted or held hostage by unrelated 
issue-linkages or broader political agendas. Provided the operator-consensus 
rules survive intact through negotiations on the international plane, they will 
face political dynamics in national legislatures that have prevented many 
 
 12 With “full stack” I continue to borrow software lingo. In software architecture, the 
“stack” refers to the layers of functionality that make up an application. 
 13 My substitution for “governance” in place of “law” for the 3.0 layer in part reflects 
that the layer does not rely the coercive powers of a state to enforce. It also reflects my 
equivocation about the boundaries of these layers, and how they map to various philosoph-
ical conceptions of law. This lecture comes at a midpoint of my thinking about how the 
rules for the space domain will be made in the future, and I expect my concept of layers to 
evolve with further research and reflection. 
 14 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1340–42 (1996). 
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countries, including the United States, from acceding even to international 
agreements overwhelmingly in the national interest. 
Could our hypothetical satellite operators enter into a contract committing 
to one another to follow the end-of-life disposal rules? In theory they could 
construct a contractual regime prescribing rules for end-of-life disposal and 
consequences for their transgression. Yet both the negotiation and enforce-
ment of such a contract would generate transactional friction at a magnitude 
the operators would likely find disproportionate to the benefits of cooperation. 
Contracts, after all, rely on the coercive power of a national legal system to 
enforce. In contract negotiations between nationals of different states, agree-
ment on which state’s laws will govern the interpretation of the contract, 
which state’s courts will have jurisdiction over disputes, and which language 
will be authoritative in interpreting the contract’s terms, can consume as much 
time as negotiations over the content of those terms. This transactional friction 
increases with the number of nationalities involved. Fixing these jurisdictional 
terms at the time the original parties enter into the contract makes it less likely 
that new satellite operators will opt-in to the contractual regime at a later date. 
And the high cost of enforcing a transnational contract makes the threat of 
sanctions for non-compliance less credible, diminishing the deterrence value 
of the contractual regime as operators weigh the costs and benefits of compli-
ance.15 
Constructing this contractual regime utilizing smart contracts built atop 
blockchain networks, such as Ethereum, would remove most of this transac-
tional friction, making the formation of such private regimes more likely and 
the resultant regimes more effective. Smart contracts are similar to traditional 
legal contracts insofar as their parties agree on a set of rules and consequences 
for breach of those rules. Unlike a traditional legal contract, which depends 
on a national legal system to adjudicate and enforce, smart contracts are self-
executing. Their rules and consequences are hard-coded, and they can auto-
matically transfer valuable digital assets such as cryptocurrency between the 
parties. They are best suited for commitments for which compliance can be 
objectively determined.16 It’s not yet possible to code “good faith,” for 
 
 15 Opting for international commercial arbitration can reduce the uncertainty and costs 
of enforcement somewhat, but the costs remain high enough that enforcement may present 
its own collective action problem among the parties. Recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award still requires recourse to national courts with jurisdiction over the breaching 
party’s assets. 
 16 I submit that the automated enforcement functionality of smart contracts may offer 
advantages even where it’s not possible to automate adjudication. In cases in which com-
pliance cannot be automatically determined to the parties’ satisfaction utilizing sensors and 
algorithms, the parties may designate individuals or institutions as “oracles,” and prescribe 
the standards to be applied, the sources of data, etc., similar to an arbitration clause. Such 
hybrid smart contracts would not have the benefit of full automation but would extend the 
benefits of automated enforcement to a wider range of agreements (those whose terms are 
not sufficiently objective to be measured solely by machine). Whereas the adjudication of 
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example. Where the bargain can be reduced to sufficiently objective rules, 
smart contracts do provide the basic functionality of a self-contained, light-
weight legal system. They enable their parties to efficiently make enforceable 
commitments to one another without recourse to a national legal system. For 
participants, regimes implemented in smart contract may feel more “legal”—
in terms of precision and enforceability—than much of the international legal 
framework for outer space. 
Let’s examine how our hypothetical satellite operators could employ smart 
contracts to construct a more efficient, more effective regime for end-of-life 
disposal of satellites. Like a traditional contract, the parties must precisely 
describe their commitments, and the consequences for breach of those com-
mitments. Unlike a traditional contract, these commitments and consequences 
are ultimately embodied in computer code; it is unnecessary to reach agree-
ment on whether English, French, Russian, or Chinese is the authoritative lan-
guage for interpreting a contract interpreted and applied by machines. Nor is 
it necessary for parties to agree on which nation’s laws and courts have juris-
diction over the contract, as the contractual regime does not rely on any na-
tional legal system for enforcement.17 Smart contracts are creatures of public 
blockchain networks, such as Ethereum, which are distributed across thou-
sands of nodes, beyond the control of any entity.   
The satellite operators would likely devote considerable attention to spec-
ifying the “oracles” that determine compliance with the smart contract’s rules 
and trigger enforcement. For an unusually simple rule—say, all satellites must 
be lower than 285 kilometers within “x” days of an objectively observable 
event—a fully-automated oracle, informed by agreed sources of space situa-
tional awareness (SSA) data, is theoretically possible. More likely, the parties 
would designate a panel of individuals or entities to interpret the SSA data 
and determine compliance with the regimes satellite disposal rules. Once an 
oracle designated by the smart contract has determined a breach of a rule, the 
contract automatically executes the consequences prescribed by the parties, 
possibly transferring valuable digital assets from the breaching party to the 
other parties. The automaticity of enforcement should enhance the deterrent 
value of the regime for operators weighing the costs and benefits of compli-
ance. 
I’ll invite you to join me in two further thought experiments to probe the 
possibilities of blockchain technologies both for Space Governance 3.0 inter-
 
such contracts may come to resemble international arbitration, the automatic enforcement 
of the oracles’ determination holds significant efficiency advantages over seeking recog-
nition and enforcement of an arbitral award in national courts. 
 17 The parties may wish to construct their smart contract in a manner enabling the courts 
of a selected nation to interpret and enforce the contract through traditional legal channels, 
as a backup measure. See, e.g., U.K. JURISDICTION TASKFORCE, LEGAL STATEMENT ON 
CRYPTOASSETS AND SMART CONTRACTS (2019). 
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operator regimes, and for unlocking new Space Law 1.0 solutions.18 To begin 
with a provocative one, let’s imagine a private, international regime for allo-
cating mining rights in celestial bodies. The regime comprises a set of rules, 
encoded in a web of smart contracts, that spacecraft operators may voluntarily 
contract into. Whether governmental or non-governmental, all operators par-
ticipate on a level playing field. For the sake of imagination, let’s import the 
basic bargain of the patent system for purposes of allocating mining rights: an 
operator that explores a resource deposit receives a twenty-year mining right 
in exchange for making this information available to the world. To obtain a 
mining right, let’s assume the operator must also lock up $1 million in a smart 
contract as a deposit. If that operator infringes upon another party’s mining 
interest or otherwise violates the conditions of the contract, that value is auto-
matically transferred to the injured party. 
The traditional mechanism for constituting and administering such a re-
gime would be to stand up a treaty-based international organization, such as 
the International Seabed Authority, to administer and enforce the rules agreed 
by the contracting parties. To date, there has not been sufficient political will 
to create such a Space Law 1.0 regime for space resources, whether pursuant 
to Article 11 of the Moon Agreement or otherwise. In broad brushstrokes, this 
thought experiment illustrates, how blockchain technologies could enable op-
erators from multiple countries to construct a regime providing a level of pre-
dictability that would aid both financing and mission planning. The contrac-
tual rights to non-interference with a mining interest are not enforceable 
against all comers; rather, the right is only enforceable against actors that par-
ticipate in the regime. Accordingly, the efficacy of this voluntary regime de-
pends upon a critical mass of operators perceiving their interests as better 
served inside the regime than outside it.   
How would such a private contractual regime mesh with the international 
law and politics of space resources? The legal question is the easier of the two. 
To get to space, the participants in this hypothetical regime must be authorized 
by their respective governments, which in turn are obliged by Article VI of 
the Outer Space Treaty to ensure the space activities of their nationals are 
carried out in conformity with the Treaty. It is through these national licensing 
processes that the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty—for example, Article 
IX obligations to prevent harmful contamination to celestial bodies—would 
be applied to space resource utilization activities on a region of the Moon, at 
a particular asteroid, or elsewhere.19 Again, this parallels the layering of public 
 
 18 To be clear, these thought experiments are not intended as proposals but illustrations 
of how blockchain technologies could unlock new possibilities for space governance. 
 19 As indicated above, I fear that the interpretation and application of Article IX’s harm-
ful contamination obligations to private planetary missions will present a Space Law 2.0 
moment if a private mission forces national licensing authorities to confront these interpre-
tive questions ahead of an understanding on the international plane. Whereas Article IX 
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and private law in terrestrial legal systems: the Outer Space Treaty establishes 
some guardrails for private ordering, and operators supplement its basic 
framework with rules embodied in commitments to one another. These oper-
ator commitments to respect each other’s mining rights—applicable only to 
operators that voluntarily opted into the regime and enforced by smart contract 
rather than the coercive machinery of a state—would not, as a legal matter, 
offend the national appropriation prohibition of Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
As a political matter, the formation of such a private space resources re-
gime is almost certain to offend a great many people who could be expected 
to challenge its legitimacy on the basis that the disposition of celestial body 
resources is a matter of broader interest than the relatively few actors capable 
of exploring and exploiting them. In particular, larger cross-domain political 
controversies over equitable sharing of benefits derived from resources be-
yond national jurisdiction have thwarted progress toward global agreement on 
space resources. A politically savvy group of operators may be able to con-
struct a private space resources regime in a manner that proactively diffuses 
these concerns by, for example, allocating a percentage of operator profits to 
a global fund. On this too, private companies have proven themselves to be 
far more pragmatic than their governments. Or perhaps the formation of a pri-
vate regime would catalyze Space Law 1.0 lawmaking on space resources by 
supplying the political will for a global bargain. In either case, transparently 
tracing and allocating resource exploitation revenues falls within the funda-
mental technical strengths of blockchain technologies. Whether a benefit-
sharing regime is voluntarily fashioned by enlightened private operators or 
imposed by governments, blockchain networks, which enable all parties to 
have confidence that the rules will execute as agreed and allow parties to trace 
and independently audit transactions across the network, efficiently perform 
many of the functions that would have traditionally required parties to estab-
lish and place their trust in an organization of international civil servants to 
carry out the agreed rules. 
For a closer look at how smart contracts might unlock new solutions in 
concert with Space Law 1.0 lawmaking, let’s return to the problem of incen-
tivizing spacecraft operators to dispose of their spacecraft at the end of its 
operational life. I have heard many proposals for a tax on mass launched into 
orbit that would go into a fund to pay for active debris removal. While I ap-
preciate the relative administrative simplicity of these proposals for solving 
one of the more difficult political challenges in space governance, I think we 
should be able to do better. For one, a mass tax creates no incentive to refrain 
from polluting Earth orbit, as operators are taxed whether or not they properly 
dispose of the mass they place in orbit. Moreover, such a mass tax would not 
 
affords state parties a great deal of flexibility to adapt it to prevailing needs and circum-
stances, maintenance of a cohesive regime will depend on coordination across states. 
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compensate operators who are harmed by the failure of other operators to re-
move their satellites at the end of their operational life, in that they must ex-
pend fuel and operational resources to maneuver around debris. Could smart 
contracts enable smarter regimes? 
For the sake of illustration, let’s turn the tax on mass launched into orbit 
into a security deposit. Among the requirements for obtaining a spectrum li-
cense, let’s imagine that operators must lock $500,000 in a smart contract.20 
This security deposit is returned to operators upon the successful disposal of 
their spacecraft. This would supply an economic incentive to ensure proper 
end-of-mission disposal that is presently absent.21 It would increase the value 
to operators of investments in satellite design and test that make on-orbit fail-
ure less likely. Some percentage of satellites can be expected to fail before the 
end of their operational life in spite of operators’ efforts, and an appropriately 
priced security deposit would create a market for active debris removal ser-
vices. 
What if a satellite is non-functional, or the operator otherwise decides to 
leave it in place? Or the operator goes out of business before the satellite can 
be brought down? With a globally-trusted source of SSA data feeding an or-
bital maneuvers “oracle,” a smart contract could transfer value from the de-
funct satellite operator’s security deposit to the operators forced to maneuver 
around it to compensate for the expenditure of fuel.22 With an open, permis-
sionless network allowing any spacecraft operator to exchange value with any 
other, I can imagine a system in which operators of maneuverable satellites 
that conjunct trade credits for maneuvers: I maneuver today, you give me a 
credit; I use that credit tomorrow with a different operator. The value to 
 
 20 This thought experiment is intended as an illustration of new technological capabili-
ties for governance rather than a proposal. Nevertheless, this illustration has elicited some 
strong reactions. Specifically, a security deposit that locks up a substantial amount of op-
erator capital would be vigorously resisted by operators, raise the capital intensity of space 
operations, and potentially price some operators out of the market. While I believe all three 
to be true, they point to an uncomfortable reality about externalities in the international 
regime for outer space: the price of space activities does not reflect their true cost, which 
could lead to an unsustainable oversupply of space activities. 
 21 In a Twitter exchange, Matt Desch, CEO of the satellite constellation operator Irid-
ium, responded to a question about how much Iridium would pay to remove the thirty dead 
satellites it was unable to deorbit, by illuminating the faint economic incentives to procure 
active removal services. Matt Desch (@IridiumBoss), TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2019), twitter.co 
m/IridiumBoss/status/1200554977460133889 (“Incremental ops cost saved is zero.  De-
creased risk to my network equals zero (all are well below). Decreased regulatory risk is 
zero (I spend the $$, and someone else runs into something). Removing 1 or 2 things from 
a catalog of 100,000 is perhaps worth only PR value.  $10K?”). 
 22 Through the lens of the Calabresi-Melamed framework for legal entitlements, such a 
regime would shift entitlements from polluters to other users of space: instead of paying 
(in fuel and operational life) for clear space, operators would pay to pollute. See Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
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operators of such a maneuver credit trading system is proportional to its net-
work effects: an operator is able to trade with any other operator it encounters. 
Were it constrained like terrestrial carbon credit trading systems—I could 
only trade credits with operators from the U.S., or the U.S. and two countries 
with which the U.S. has bilateral agreements for interoperation of credit trad-
ing systems—the system’s value would be greatly diminished. Blockchain 
networks serve as a medium for spacecraft operators to transact and make en-
forceable commitments to any other operator, irrespective of their countries 
of origin. It is this attribute that I believe will be among this technology’s most 
transformative contribution to governance and commerce in the space do-
main. 
To conclude, I have stratified space governance into three layers, distin-
guished by who makes the rules, and the paths those rules take on their way 
to shaping the behavior of spacecraft operators. In Space Law 1.0, the rules 
are forged through inter-state negotiation by national governments repre-
sented by their foreign ministries. To bind the growing majority of space ac-
tors that are non-governmental, these rules must be extended by national leg-
islatures and regulators. In principle, national legislatures and regulators are 
not making the rules, but extending rules adopted on the international plane 
to nongovernmental actors. In Space Law 2.0, the rules are made through in-
tra-state legislative negotiations involving many of the same actors as the 1.0 
paradigm, but with a different balance of authority between them, shifted bur-
dens of persuasion, and a fainter signal from international legal and govern-
ance considerations. The rules bind nationals of the state in question and other 
operators under its jurisdiction. The risk to a cohesive regime is that the oper-
ators of different states will be bound by different, incompatible rules. In 
Space Governance 3.0, the rules are made through inter-operator negotiation, 
public and private, or accepted by operators that opt in after the rules are fixed. 
Space governance layers are not distinguished solely by tooling: whether 
the rules are fixed in treaties, statutes, or smart contracts. For example, the 
thought experiment around security deposits for mass placed in orbit illus-
trates how blockchain technologies could be employed to enhance the range 
and efficacy of Space Law 1.0 lawmaking. The rules in that thought experi-
ment—thou shall not place mass in orbit without posting a security deposit in 
accordance with these procedural rules and formulas—are fixed by national 
governments on the international plane and extended to private operators by 
national radiocommunications regulators, the common gate through which 
virtually every private mission passes on its way to space.23 Once fixed and 
 
 23 Given its coordinating role in the national radiocommunications licensing processes 
through which virtually every private space mission passes, the International Telecommu-
nications Union (ITU) would provide a logical forum for the interstate agreement mandat-
ing our hypothetical security deposit regime, provided this subject matter could be squared 
with the ITU Constitution. Within its relatively narrow bands of competence for space 
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extended, those rules could be administered more efficiently and effectively 
by operation of smart contracts, than by standing up an international organi-
zation to administer those rules or an international agreement prescribing de-
tailed technical rules for coordination among national regulators. Smart con-
tracts allow all concerned to have very high confidence that the rules will be 
executed. It is whether those rules are set by intergovernmental negotiation or 
directly by operators that determines whether it is 1.0 or 3.0. 
Whereas I have illustrated each layer using cases of mandatory rules bind-
ing upon operators—whether by regulatory or contractual mechanisms—I be-
lieve that the important corpus of expressly non-binding norms relating to 
space activities fit within the three layers I have described, rather than com-
prising distinctive layers of space governance. For example, I see the UN Re-
mote Sensing Principles24 as a classic case of Space Law 1.0, notwithstanding 
the fact that the intergovernmental rules are non-binding: the Principles were 
negotiated over the course of a decade in COPUOS, adopted unanimously by 
the General Assembly. Portions of the Principles became binding on private 
operators through national legislation and regulation.   
I see the Space Safety Coalition’s Best Practices for the Sustainability of 
Space Operations,25 formulated and endorsed by spacecraft operators and 
civil society participants, and the Space Sustainability Rating,26 a voluntary 
rating initiative designed to strengthen operator incentives for sustainable or-
bital operations, as fitting most comfortably within Space Governance 3.0. I 
conceptualize these recent initiatives as direct-to-operator norm construction: 
the rules are made by (or with the active involvement of) spacecraft operators, 
and the initiatives aim to propagate norms of behavior internalized by opera-
tors without regulatory intermediation.27 The “undersigned space industry 
stakeholders” of the Space Safety Coalition “[u]rge . . . [a]ll space actors to 
promote and adhere to the best practices herein . . . ,”28 perhaps calculating 
that the articulation of best practices endorsed by an influential cross-section 
of operators, and their own demonstrated adherence to them, will gradually 
increase the normative pull of the best practices. The Space Sustainability 
 
governance, the ITU radiocommunications coordination processes, implemented by na-
tional licensing authorities, is perhaps the most consistent Space Law 1.0 process to date. 
 24 G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to the Remote Sensing of Earth from Outer Space 
(Dec. 3, 1986). 
 25 Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations, SPACE SAFETY COALITION 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://spacesafety.org/best-practices/ [hereinafter Best Practices]. 
 26 See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, Space Sustainability Rating (2020), https://www.wef 
orum.org/projects/space-sustainability-rating. 
 27 Whereas Space Governance 3.0 mixes governmental and non-governmental actors, 
without hierarchy, in the process of formulating norms of behavior, my approach is shaped 
by the International Relations literature on the origination and internalization of norms by 
states. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Po-
litical Change, 52 INT’L L. ORG. 897 (1998). 
 28 Best Practices, supra note 25, at 9. 
2020] SPACE GOVERNANCE 3.0 729 
Rating will follow a corporate social responsibility path for promoting norms 
of sustainable operations by rating satellite operators. Because the rules are 
made by (or in close cooperation with) satellite operators and are designed to 
shape operator behavior without governmental intermediation, I believe both 
initiatives fit the Space Governance 3.0 paradigm.   
It is too early to classify the recently concluded initiatives of the Guide-
lines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS Guide-
lines) adopted by UN COPUOS,29 and the Building Blocks for the Develop-
ment of an International Framework on Space Resource Activities adopted by 
the Hague International Space Resources Working Group (Hague Working 
Group).30 The LTS Guidelines were forged through nearly a decade of inter-
national negotiations in the UN and were adopted by consensus; governments 
have said the LTS Guidelines will be reflected in national legislation and reg-
ulations. This appears to follow the classically Space Law 1.0 pattern of the 
Remote Sensing Principles. Should the Principles’ ultimate influence upon 
space operations follow the direct-to-operator path, however, the Principles 
will straddle my 1.0 and 3.0 layers. The Hague Working Group, a track 1.5 
initiative in which operators, civil society, and governments played on a level 
playing field, was initially conceived as pre-work for a treaty on space re-
sources. It thus initially appeared to straddle the layers in the opposite direc-
tion: 3.0 on rule formation, and a 1.0 path to shaping operator behavior. At 
the conclusion of its work, however, the Hague Working Group charted a di-
rect-to-operator course, encouraging operators of all kinds to “consider and 
use the Building Blocks,”31 further aligning the initiative with the 3.0 para-
digm.32 
Ultimately, my task is not a comprehensive taxonomy of space governance 
initiatives, but to envision the future of space governance. My aim in stratify-
ing initiatives into layers is to isolate salient trends in who makes the rules 
governing space activities and how those rules come to shape the behavior of 
spacecraft operators. Space Governance 3.0 is not the future of space govern-
ance but will be an increasingly important layer in an overall governance 
 
 29 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustain-
ability of Outer Space Activities, UN Doc. A/AC.105/2018/CRP.20 (2018). 
 30 The Hague Int’l Space Res. Working Grp., Building Blocks for the Development of an 
International Framework on Space Resource Activities (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.univ 
ersiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor-publiekrecht/luch 
t—en-ruimterecht/space-resources/bb-thissrwg—cover.pdf. 
 31 Id. at 1. 
 32 The Hague Working Group initially appeared to follow the traditional pattern of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), in which expert deliberations form the basis for mul-
tilateral treaty making. The Hague Working Group’s ultimate product, however, follows 
the ILC’s more recent (and controversial) practice of commending the product to the atten-
tion of states. See David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradox-
ical Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 857 (2002). 
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“stack” including Space Law 1.0, and Space Law 2.0 when 1.0 lawmaking 
mechanisms fail to keep pace with path-breaking private space activities. To-
day, I see potential for a vibrant future of space activities enabled by more 
efficient, effective governance mechanisms, as well as signs of a future 
stunted by regime fragmentation. The single most important determinant be-
tween the optimistic and dismal versions of the future, in my view, is actors 
in every governance layer respecting and maintaining the constitutional role 
of the Outer Space Treaty. As rule making becomes increasingly decentral-
ized, a state of constitutional multipolarity will preserve a regime that may 
flex and bend at times but does not break. 
   
 
